

Remarks by the Right Honourable Kim Campbell Middle Powers Initiatives VI Forum The Hague, March 3, 2006

Many years ago I was a graduate student of Leonard Shapiro, a great scholar in the field of Soviet studies at the London School of Economics. Every Tuesday evening he held a seminar where visiting scholars would come and make presentations. The most accomplished and confident people would be reduced to jelly when Leonard gave them elaborate and complimentary introductions that no one short of the deity himself/herself could ever live up to. I feel the same way when Doug Roche introduces me because I always feel like a bit of fraud in this group. I know that I am sitting with people who are deeply knowledgeable about the issues, but also who are also engaged with them in an ongoing permanent way. I am very proud to be a part of the Middle Powers Initiative. I am on the advisory board of the Global Security Institute because Alan Cranston called me once and asked me to be on the board with the promise that there would be no meetings. I said, 'that's the kind of board I would like to belong to!' But, to the extent that I am able to participate, I try to share whatever political capital comes from my former positions to be involved in missions and I am very happy to do it. So, I recognize that my ability to do that rests on the kind of work that the people around this table do, the deep scholarly work, the long, time-consuming, bottom-numbing negotiations in diplomatic fora. I am very proud to be here with my country's ambassador, Paul Meyer. There are many other of my countrymen and women who work tirelessly to make me a credible person when I go around the world. So I would just like to say that I don't have any illusions about being an expert, but I care deeply about the issue. I think that I share your frustration that this issue, which is so important for the future of our planet seems to have such a hard time getting onto the agenda. That is why the Middle Powers Initiative was designed to keep the non-proliferation issue on the international agenda.

As Doug Roche said, I am the Secretary General of the Club of Madrid, and our focus is on democratic transition and consolidation. I thought, since I was asked to reflect a bit on the importance of cooperative multi-lateral security, I would tell you first about a meeting that we convened last March in Madrid. This was a global summit on democracy, terrorism, and security. From the Club of Madrid's perspective, our interest was in terrorism as a threat to democracy, and we believed that there were two sides of the discussion Democracies play by the same rules, the rule of law, and they should be able to collaborate on a very deep level in dealing with this particular kind of threat, which is basically an initiative by mostly non-state actors. But also, with the fear created by terrorism—with its very unpredictability—citizens of democratic countries are often complicit in surrendering some of their democratic liberties if they feel that is necessary to protect their security. To mark the anniversary of the Atocha bombings we convened a meeting in Madrid which brought together about two hundred of the world's leading scholars who worked in working groups prior to the actual meeting, and completed their deliberations in Madrid. The meeting also brought another group of experts and practitioners together in twenty high-level panels. The work of both the working groups and high-level panels was distilled and brought to a group of our members who themselves drafted the Madrid Agenda, which is a series of principles and recommendations which came out of this extraordinary gathering of experts and practitioners from over fifty countries. The reason why it was such a good process was because, as a group of people who are out of power, we are independent, and each one of us was a strong

partisan in our own home country. But we have only one ideology now and that is our support for democracy. We were able to create a very free and open discussion. We had one agenda, and that was to get the best thinking on the issues. When I met with the working group coordinators in January of 2005, two months before the final meeting, they asked if I would like them to get consensus in the working groups, and I said no, that our purpose was to create recommendations that policy makers can use. So, I didn't want them to force consensus. I wanted them to find it where it exists, which would be very helpful, but where it doesn't exist, people need to know. Where there are issues where more information is needed before any conclusion can be drawn, it would be helpful to know this too.

I tell you this because what was very interesting was that there were a number of issues that came out of this conference where there was a consensus, what some have come to call the "Madrid Consensus." Across the board, among the 16 groups, that looked at factors contributing to terrorism: social, religious, economic issues, legal responses, intelligence with military and policing. Across the board, there was consensus that terrorism is a phenomenon that must be countered on a multilateral basis with full respect for the rule of law and respect for human rights. Now, what this meant was, that in a non-forced process, where there were experts from all sides, from all of the ways that people could look at the elephant - those who were looking at the psychological theories and social and cultural theories, and those who were engaged in the hardnosed on the ground activities of countering terrorism. (One of our group heads was a former, three-time secretary general of INTERPOL.) They all came to the same conclusion. But I think that it is extremely important to remember that the concern about the rule of law, the concern of multilateralism, isn't some marginal, flaky, dewy-eyed, pie-in-the-sky, 'wouldn't it be great if the world were a perfect place' phenomenon. It comes from people whose daily lives center on dealing with threats to their societies. Whether they see the respect for human rights as a moral imperative rather than a practical imperative, they conclude that it is both and that you cannot successfully deal with these issues without that kind of multilateral cooperation and respect for rule of law and human rights. So that was very interesting for me, because as I said, it was not a foregone conclusion, and the deliberations took place in a context where people were not asked to agree and their hosts had no political agenda but to get from them the best possible thinking. So we must be proud and confident about our reliance and insistence on multilateralism because it makes sense. It is the mechanism that works, and we should never feel that we should be apologetic about it. It is important perhaps to look at terrorism; not only because we fear that nuclear weapons will be used in terrorist attacks, but because terrorism as a threat to societies is a motivator in public policy to the extent that it is, and comes out to the nuclear era. Terrorism is the fear factor used to engender public support for hard power, so the concern that other people have for the unpredictable kinds of attacks of terrorism, create an atmosphere in which some people advocate the need to be tough and keep all these types of weapons. That's the atmosphere in which these messages are being delivered. So it's interesting to ask ourselves, how serious is the terrorist threat?

A recent study done by the University of Ghent, using American data, analyzed terrorist attacks over the last 30 years. They concluded that the number of international terrorist incidents is on the decline, but domestic terrorism, a lot of it in Iraq, is on the increase. The conclusion of this study is that terrorism is not a threat as much as it is a challenge. So it's out there, but its unpredictability is, of course, what keeps us on edge. If you actually look at the statistics of people killed in terrorist attacks the number is actually declining, not growing. If you have the sense that it's growing, then you are someone who is receiving the messages that the media are trying to demonstrate but are not supported statistically. We also know that wars are also declining, and if we look at what the security threats are these days, I believe that we are looking

at technology strikes, the kinds of threats where people can hack into our computer systems, pull our utilities down, and perhaps break down our financial systems. These kinds of threats where people want to undermine our society are very much out there.

The accidental use of nuclear weapons is also a significant threat to human security. I am not saying that war and terrorism are not threats, but I think that we sometimes have perceptions that the threats are much greater and that more lives are being lost from international terrorism than is in fact the case. But where do nukes fit into the landscape of threat? I would argue that nuclear weapons are an artifact of state versus state enmity, but especially conflict between geographically distant states. I think that is really a key part of why nuclear weapons seemed to be a very useable instrument during the Cold War. If Canada were the Soviet Union, would nuclear weapons have been such an important part of American strategy during the Cold War? Now, you may think that that is somewhat of a ridiculous hypothesis, but the fact of the matter is that the United States would not have been so keen on dropping nuclear weapons on Vancouver or Toronto or Ottawa, given the geographical proximity of those cities to the United States. The fact that you could lob a nuke on Moscow and hope that the nuclear fallout wasn't going to affect you was very significant in terms of calculations of the utility of this kind of weapon. So I think that what we saw was the notion that you could, in fact, lob these things at one another. But it was a very particular time not only in ideological differences but also in the geopolitical relationship of the combatants during the Cold War.

So if the danger of nuclear war is no longer the threat that we face, why is anybody trying to keep nukes? We find the anomaly of people looking for new justifications for nuclear weapons rather than being happy that we can now faze them out. They were developed for a particular set of threats and challenges, and for conflicts that would take place in particular geographical relationships, and instead of saying, "Thank goodness those days are over," people are trying to find new reasons to keep them. Paul Meyer was very right when he said we need to fight the salience of nuclear weapons. That is one of the key issues. They are simply useless. You've probably noticed that Jonathan Granoff and I like to quote Chuck Horner. When I became Minister of National Defense, one of my first visitors was Chuck Horner who was the commander of NORAD at that time. NORAD in theory reports to both the Canadian minister of defense and the American secretary of defense. He is very active in non-proliferation and disarmament issues now, and he makes a point by saying, "I don't like nuclear weapons. I want weapons I can actually use." They're totally useless. I don't know why anyone would want them. It's like saying would you like a TNT bomb in your basement. There was a time when having a TNT bomb was very helpful, but having one in your basement is more danger than help. So, once you don't need them anymore, what is the calculus of keeping them? It is very interesting because the same people in the United States who are pushing for bunker busters are the same people who promised that Iraq was going to be a slam dunk. I think what we have to do is to create a very healthy sense of skepticism in the public for the people who are making these decisions about weapons. Those who wish to keep nuclear weapons often equate anti-nuclear advocates or policy with weakness. This is what I call the theory of muscularity and nukes: those who don't like nukes are wimpy and don't like having that real strength. The current American administration is very vindictive to its opponents, both domestic and foreign. Members of the President's own party who seek to argue with him in Congress quickly feel the wrath of the White House. This is not a political environment in which the notion of the loyal opposition and debate is encouraged. This means that there is really no true dialogue. We have to reclaim the ground of effective security policy by those who want to abolish nuclear weapons. We have to reclaim the high ground. We have to make the point that those who wish to abolish nuclear weapons are the realists, are the tough minded people, are the ones who are facing real threats and are prepared

to address them as opposed to those who are still living in a post WWII mentality and are not prepared to look ahead. I can give you some examples. Obviously, nukes are a threat. The use of them and their falling into terrorist hands are very frightening. Terrorists could take them to a distant place. Someone who is not a state actor could take them someplace far away from where they live. We know that some terrorists are quite willing to be suicide bombers, so they may not mind themselves blowing up in a mushroom cloud. But then, supposing we know that, we cannot use nukes to retaliate. Who or what do you target them against? So someone blows up a nuclear weapon in New York, what do you do about it? Are we going to target nuclear weapons on Mecca? At more Islamic terrorists? We're going to nuke Mecca. Oh yeah, sure. That will be a real way to create world peace. Jeddah? Tehran? Of course, we're not going to do this. So let us acknowledge that they are totally useless and therefore, we should try not to let them fall into the hands of people who would be willing to use them because they are not constrained in the way that states are.

Finding Osama Bin Laden. Remember the argument for bunker busters? They have these terrible bunkers in Afghanistan, and we need nuclear weapons to take them out. The problem with taking them out is not firepower but finding them. There are all sorts of ways that you can attack them. The same week, in fact, that bunker busters were being talked about in the context of Osama Bin Laden and the deep caverns in Afghanistan, the American military tested the MOAB, the "mother of all bombs", the largest conventional weapon ever tested, which has the destructive firepower very similar to a destructive power of a bunker buster. It is probably a pretty terrible thing, but then again, it isn't radioactive nor does it break the nuclear taboo. So the issue is not having the nuclear weapons, but rather finding the people who are the bad guys, figuring out how to counter them, and rendering them harmless. Once you find a bunker, also, they can't move it, so you have time to think about it.

When I became Minister of National Defense, I said that I thought that it was very premature to beat our swords into ploughshares. I really believed at that time, in Canada in 1993, that the most important capacity for a military, (while recognizing that Canada is not a superpower or great military power) was well-trained, well-equipped, flexible, conventional capability. This is what modern states needed now. Plus, as we've seen, the capacity to deal with different cultures is, at least for Canada, a peace keeping function. It is very clear that we need these highly-trained and professional, military people. But we have an American government that wants to keep nuclear weapons, but cannot equip its soldiers in Iraq with sufficient body armor and armed vehicles. It is an absolutely incredible anomaly. We cannot let these things pass. We have to say, what do mean you need these nukes? You're the people where 80% fatalities in Iraq could have been prevented with proper body armor. It is extraordinary. If the soldiers and marines say that this armor is extremely heavy and they don't like it, where is the military industrial complex, the technology, and the research that would find the new materials etc that would genuinely protect the people in harm's way in this very difficult conflict? Additionally, I think that a similar proportion of casualties resulted from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) going off in the face of armed vehicles. Now, an armed Humvee does not necessarily mean that it is immune to an explosion if the explosion happens right underneath it, but it is extraordinary that the same people who are trying to keep nuclear weapons cannot keep their eye on the ball protecting the people they are sending into harm's way. I say this because we cannot let the argument be that those who want to get rid of nukes are somehow wimpy or weak. No! What we are is focused on where the real dangers are and what it takes in terms of policy, material, and financial investment to make it possible for the democratic, peace-loving, law-abiding countries of the world to perform military tasks effectively in this 21st century. That is what we need to be hard-nosed about. In fact, if anything, relying on nuclear weapons, which is the square root of

nothing in terms of their effectiveness, is stupid and wasteful. It is weak. It's for people for whom these are the symbols of military effectiveness. So, again, not only the body armor problem, but also Hurricane Katrina was very interesting. There was a complete breakdown of communications there. Shortly before Hurricane Katrina, I was at a Security Conference in Ireland where we were talking about where we would do a follow-up meeting on the Madrid Summit. The head of the Coast Guard for Region Eight, which is the Gulf of Mexico was there and gave a very interesting presentation about the how they worked with the private sector to manage the security threats in the Gulf of Mexico. When you look at the satellite photographs and you see all of the oil platforms there, you realize this is really the soft underbelly of the United States. --Hugely important for oil production. -- Hugely important for shipping. I think the Mississippi is 60% of American commercial shipping and it comes up through the Gulf of Mexico. The liquid natural gas port is also there. Here is a hugely important strategic target. They didn't need a terrorist bomber because Katrina came in and tore everything up, but what was interesting was that there was a total breakdown in communication. When the cell phone towers went out, only the people with old fashioned radio technology could communicate. So you say to yourself, what if this had been a terrorist attack? Forget the nukes. Let's focus on where the real vulnerabilities are, and let us not let anybody tell us that nuclear weapons are the badge that entitles you to be taken seriously in the issue of security. If they are anything, they are an embarrassment. This notion of making them a stigma is extremely interesting. The notion that treaties erode sovereignty is another very interesting one, especially when the argument is made by the architects of the treaties. This argument saying "he forced me to do it." - America made these treaties. The notion that somehow they erode its sovereignty is bogus and should not be tolerated for a nanosecond. The thing about treaties is that they allow states to choose how they will erode their sovereignty and how they will surrender it. If you do not have these treaties and you don't have security, someone else will make that decision for you. If you look at the impact of 9/11 on the United States, on its public policy, on its economy, and on the ease of movement - the United States has paid a huge price for that. Someone else has set their policy. Someone else has told them what they have to do. This isn't American sovereignty. So you either take the steps that will enable you to choose when and to whom you will give up some sovereignty in order to improve your security, or someone else will do it. There is no state in the world, including the United States, which is 100% sovereign. It doesn't exist, and it isn't going to happen. So this argument has to be rejected because it just isn't acceptable. The United States is not a weak state that is forced to sign agreements. It is a prime mover. Treaty supporters are not wimps.

What can we do? I like the idea of making the possessions of nuclear weapons a stigma. They are dangerous to their owners. We can bring out the stories of Soviet nuclear accidents. Even the reality of Chernobyl can help us understand what it means when we have these types of explosions. I think there is some interesting research on U.S. testing grounds and the effect on people who have lived close to them. But if young people are concerned about the environment, nukes are the ultimate environmental issue. They cannot be used without poisoning the earth, and therefore their use is immoral. People have to understand also the difference between nuclear weapons and atom bombs. In some ways, one of the problems of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is that people can look to those cities as having recovered. Those cities suffered terribly from atom bombs. They did recover. It was very hard, and they suffered very badly. We won't recover from nuclear weapons on our cities, and I think that it is a message that has to be delivered. There is a qualitative difference between these two forms of weapons. What I really like is the notion of nuclear weapon-free zones. I think it would be interesting if countries declared themselves nuclear-free zones, or even if non-nuclear states demanded of the nuclear weapon states guarantees and assurances that they are not targeted by their missiles because that would bring to the public attention that the United States and Russia have nuclear armed

missiles which are targeted and on hair-trigger alert. How do you bring that message forward? One suggestion would be to have the cities of the world ask for guarantees that they are not targeted by your weapons because they don't have nuclear weapons. Perhaps even to create an international norm, law, or designated war crime to ever target a nuclear weapon towards a country that is a non-nuclear state. How can the non-nuclear states use their leverage, and how can we bring home the notion that these dangers still exist? The argument for nukes often equates security with big bangs and there is a kind of confusion with muscularity and, pardon my saying it, masculinity, with this notion of we have to be tough and we have to be muscular. But many of the current advocates for nuclear weapons in the United States did not want to risk their own lives in a war that they actually supported. So, this is not a policy which derives from courage, and we have to reclaim the security high ground from the people whose weakness will kill us and render life on earth a torture. Survival is a Darwinian struggle, but if we keep nukes, we are failing to adapt.

One of my favorite philosophers says that the unit of human understanding is the story, and I would like to conclude with one. There is a book by Robert Sapolsky called A Primate's Memoir. Robert Sapolsky is the Jane Goodall of baboons - living in Africa with them, and it's a wonderful book. He tells a story of observing the male baboons. The male baboons dominate the females so that they know who their offspring are. But he observed in one group a male baboon that was quite different from the other male baboons and was actually quite friendly to the female baboons and helpful to them. He was very peaceful and hung out with them. I don't know what baboons talk about, but he was a very friendly baboon and behaved very differently. What Robert Sapolsky observed was that this baboon had many more offspring that survived than the others. He knew who his offspring were, and they had a much higher level of survival than the others. Let me conclude by saying, if even a baboon can use his brain to do something different from the other males that ensures the survival of his offspring, then why can't we? We know what must be done, and we need to find ways to tell the story so that the wise ones among us can make us safe.

Thank you very much.